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Supplier managementBuilding and managing a supplier base has been referred to in the literature as a key aspect of supplier
management. Scholars have proposed a number of models aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of supplier
network management, mainly based on a portfolio approach. In the IMP tradition of research, those models
are often criticized as they ignore the interdependencies between the different existing dyadic relationships
of a focal buyer company and its suppliers. Such interdependencies are the main focus of this paper, which
has four objectives: (1) To analyze the types of relationships linking suppliers, (2) to understand the factors
and dynamics underlying the creation and management of these relationships (3) to uncover existing links
between buyer–supplier and supplier–supplier relationships, and (4) to clarify how different conﬁgurations
of supplier relationship interactions impact on the performance of the actors involved. The paper discusses
two empirical case studies, using the supplier networks of two focal buyer companies. We ﬁnd that supplier
interdependencies are mainly a by-product of the buyer–supplier dyads. Furthermore, the nature and
dynamics of these dyads are a strong determinant of the scope and frequency of supplier connections and the
corresponding effects on performance.rito@fep.up.pt (C. Brito),
l rights reserved.© 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Globalization and specialization processes have led to the intensiﬁca-
tion of competition in most industries (Harland, Lamming, & Cousins,
1999). In order to cope with such challenges, companies tend to reassess
their competitive positioningby specializing around their core capabilities
and resources, and by buying or mobilizing other resources from a
network of customers (Ford, Gadde, Håkansson, & Snehota, 2003) and
suppliers (Cousins & Spekman, 2003). In such an environment of resource
dependencies (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005),
purchasing decisions gain growing importance, giving supply manage-
ment a strategic character (Gattorna & Walters, 1996). The resulting
supplier networks encompass diverse companies with different ﬁt vis-à-
vis thebuyer company's context and its strategic intent. As a consequence,
managing supplier networks involves not only the individual dyadic
relationship with single suppliers but the entire set of supplier relation-
ships, including the interdependencies between them. Traditionally,
supplier portfolio models have been used to represent supply relation-
ships. However, although empirical studies have shown that suchmodels
enjoy a high reputation among practitioners (Wagner & Johnson, 2004;Gelderman & vanWeele, 2005), they have been receivedwith skepticism
byacademics. In particular, researchwithin the tradition of the IMPGroup
(cf. Håkansson & Ford, 2002; Ford &Håkansson, 2006) has been critical of
these portfolio models' lack of an integrative view, e.g. by not taking into
account supplier interdependencies (Dubois & Pedersen, 2002).
Thus, the challenge is to understand the complexities, and particularly
the interdependencieswhichare related tomultiple supplier relationships
existing within the portfolio of a buying company. Of special interest for
our research is thequestionofhowthese interactions comeabout, howfar
the focal buying company is involved in these interactions, and how they
impact on the different dyadic buyer–supplier relationships as well as on
supplymanagement performance. Thus,we aim to investigate the nature,
creation, dynamics, and effects of supplier interdependencies within the
supplier network of a focal buyer. A better understanding of these issues
will clarify the potential beneﬁts, but also the limitations of supplier
connections and the cross-over effects on ﬁrms' performance resulting
from interdependencies of supplier business relationships. Our contribu-
tion is therefore particular to the area of uncovering different structures of
supplier interdependencies beyond the more simplistic explanations
provided by portfolio models.
The article is divided as follows: after this introduction, the second
section addresses supplier networks both from a portfolio perspective
and a network perspective. This is followed by a discussion of the
methodology of the research project, and a description of the empirical
cases. Findings and ﬁnally discussions of the main theoretical and
managerial contributions drawn from our research will conclude this
article.
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The context of purchasing management in an industrial setting has
been changing, moving from the ‘simple’ outsourcing of production
and supply of resources as part of the ‘sorting decisions’ of a company
(Alderson & Martin, 1965) to complex decisions about higher level
and value-adding services, such as design and product development
(Gadde & Håkansson, 2001). As a consequence, companies buy
different resources (e.g. products, knowledge, brands, reputation)
from different suppliers in order to transform and integrate them
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005). In this context,
the speciﬁcs of the supplier base are considered the cornerstone of
supplier management. Therefore, in order to provide the conceptual
background for our article, the extant literature on supplier portfolios
is brieﬂy surveyed, emphasizing main strengths and limitations. This
leads to the introduction of a network perspective which will serve as
the conceptual anchor for understanding the interdependencies
between supplier relationships.
2.1. Understanding and managing supplier networks as portfolios
The concept of a ‘product as a network entity’ is used as ametaphor
for the interconnectedness of actors, activities and resources needed to
create a single offering (Dubois & Pedersen, 2002). It also emphasizes
the increasingly important role that suppliers play in the success of a
buying company (Wagner & Johnson, 2004). Inasmuch as the type of
resources and activities integrated in an offering and the degree of
exploitation vis-à-vis exploration are different, the organization of
resource access andmobilizationmust also be different (Loasby, 1998;
Araújo, Dubois, & Gadde, 1999, 2003). There exists no ideal buyer–
supplier relationship type to achieve this, and the determination of
what constitutes an optimal supplier relationship is by its very nature
contingent upon many factors (Ford et al., 2003). Companies must
therefore decide what relational strategy to adopt with each supplier
and how to allocate resources among supplier relationships (Ritter &
Ford, 2004).
One solution to this problem is proposed in the form of selective
portfolio strategies to reach ‘optimum’ supplier relationships based on
identifying which suppliers should be interacted with in a more
intensive way, and which should be managed in a less intensive way
(Wagner & Boutelier, 2002; Wagner & Johnson, 2004). Such portfolio
models were introduced as a tool to manage a balanced combination
of supplier relationships best serving the long-term interests of the
buyer company (Turnbull, 1990). The ﬁrst major conceptual devel-
opment in this area was Kraljic (1983) matrix. Its goal was to
minimize supply risks and maximize the buying company's bargain-
ing power. The departure point of Kraljic's matrix relates to two
variables: product relevance and supply risk. Each purchasing item is
analyzed according to these two criteria and consequently placed in
one of four categories. Companies then analyze their bargaining
power vis-à-vis the suppliers, identify areas of opportunities or
vulnerabilities, evaluate supply risks, and set resulting purchase
strategies for eachmatrix category (e.g. explore or diversify sources of
supply) (Kraljic, 1983). This matrix model was widely accepted by
managers and is considered even today as the standard in the ﬁeld of
purchasing (Gelderman & van Weele, 2005).
Other portfolio models have been developed since then, focusing
on clients (e.g., Turnbull & Zolkiewski, 1997), on suppliers (e.g., Olsen
& Ellram, 1997; Bensaou, 1999; Nellore & Söderquist, 2000;
Hartmann, Ritter, & Gemünden, 2001; Gelderman & van Weele,
2002) or generally on business relationships (Krapfel, Salmond, &
Spekman, 1991; Zolkiewski & Turnbull, 2000). These matrix models
vary in terms of the factors, factor weights, or number of analysis
steps. The choice of variables represents the cornerstone of portfolio
models and is quite problematic. Problems concerned with choosing
the most suitable variables, measuring them properly, and theinclusion of environmental factors have been discussed as major
limitations (Nellore & Söderquist, 2000; Zolkiewski & Turnbull, 2000).
Furthermore, Dubois, and Pedersen (2002) argue that portfolio
matrixes constitute an oversimpliﬁcation of reality, and they question
the possibility of deﬁning business strategies based on this type of
tool.
Furthermore, portfolio models assume suppliers as passive actors
(Gelderman & van Weele, 2002), disregarding the fact that the
implementation of a supply strategy is contingent on the joint efforts
of the buyer company as well as the suppliers (Axelsson, 1992;
Hartmann et al., 2001). Thus, besides identifying critical suppliers
(which is arguably possible via portfolio models), managers still face
the challenge of mobilizing these suppliers (Mouzas & Naudé, 2007)
for which portfolio models do not provide guidance.
The point of departure for this article relates to the inherent
limitations of portfolio models from an interaction perspective: as
Dubois, and Pedersen (2002) state, portfolio and matrix models are
static since they do not take account of the dynamism, particularly the
interdependencies between suppliers, inherent in interaction pro-
cesses underlying business relationships. Portfolios treat buyer–
supplier relationships as isolated dyads which constitute the unit of
analysis by applying an ‘optimization perspective’, thus they do not
capture all ranges of possible interactions (Zolkiewski & Turnbull,
2002). The interdependence between supplier relationships is
restricted to the optimal allocation of buyer's resources to each of
these supplier relationships. This means that other interdependencies
and contingencies between the many different supplier relationships
are ignored, even if these could produce substantial beneﬁts for the
companies involved (such as economies of scale, or coordination
efﬁciencies) (Dubois et al., 2004). For instance, as Dyer and colleagues
have shown, Toyota has long recognized the beneﬁts of learning via
sharing knowledgewith its suppliers and of stimulating the sharing of
knowledge between the suppliers themselves (Dyer & Nobeoka,
2000; Dyer & Hatch, 2004).
In a similar vein, Håkansson, Havila, and Pedersen (1999) claim
that a supplier has a higher probability of learning and innovating
when connected with the buyer's other suppliers. Inasmuch as
competitive advantages are more and more linked to interorganiza-
tional learning (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000), treating supplier relation-
ships as isolated dyads risks limiting the buyer's as well as the
suppliers' possibility of exploring their full potential. Therefore, a
network perspective, based on an interaction model which takes the
existing interdependencies between business relationships into
account, needs to be employed (Ford & Håkansson, 2006). This
means broadening the dyadic buyer–supplier interaction at least to
triads, i.e. buyer–supplier–supplier relationships (Phillips, Liu, &
Costello, 1998; Choi & Wu, 2009).
In summary, supplier portfolio management based on a matrix
rationale to deﬁne with which suppliers a focal buyer should interact,
in what way, and how it shouldmanage its supplier relationships with
them according to its strategic goals, has been criticized for different
reasons (Wagner & Johnson, 2004). However, for the purpose of our
article the main shortcoming relates to the inability of portfolio
models to take into account the network effects of supplier
interdependence and indirect supplier relationships which affect the
buying company. We posit that portfolio models provide neither a
truly integrative network perspective of the interdependencies
between supplier relationships nor a dynamic perspective of how
relationships, capabilities and resources evolve within such triadic
structures. Consequently, this makes it unavoidable to take supplier–
supplier interdependencies into account.
2.2. Supplier networks and the network perspective
The need to use a network rationale, and its implicit criticism of
portfoliomodels, has been demonstrated by the studies of Araújo et al.
927C. Roseira et al. / Industrial Marketing Management 39 (2010) 925–935(1999) and Mota, and de Castro (2005) who show how the decisions
concerning a speciﬁc client or supplier may affect the relationships
with other clients or suppliers. Interdependencies within a portfolio
are better analyzed through the association between the variety of
supplier relationships, on the one hand, and the focal ﬁrm's strategy to
use and develop relational capabilities, on the other (Sivadas & Dwyer,
2000; Ma, Yao, & Xi, 2009). The goals and perceptions of all relevant
suppliers are equally important in this process. The importance of the
direct as well as indirect effects that relationshipsmay have upon each
other has frequently been highlighted in the broader IMP literature
(e.g., Håkansson & Johanson, 1993; Ford &McDowell, 1999; Holmen &
Perdersen, 2003). Thus, the characteristics and effects of each supplier
relationship depend on their complementarity with the structure of
activities and resources of the focal buyer company as well as its other
supplier relationship partners (Håkansson & Snehota, 1995). Hori-
zontal supplier relationships are mutually (inter-)dependent, there-
fore cross-over effects due to network characteristics of the supply
arrangements can be expected, which may or may not be intended,
predictable, or positive for the buying company (Ford & McDowell,
1999).
The existence of such cross-over effects means that to understand
a buying company's supply relationships, the characteristics of the
underlying triads (i.e. buyer–supplier–supplier relationships) need to
be explored. For instance, improvements in product quality by a
particular supplier may lead the buyer company to demand similar
changes from its other suppliers (buyer-involved cross-over effects).
Furthermore, different suppliers may share knowledge about a
technological innovation in order to establish new product standards
which improves their efﬁciency in dealing with a buyer company
(buyer-independent cross-over effects). Anticipating and/or manag-
ing such cross-over effects may help the buyer company to minimize
possible negative outcomes and maximize positive ones (the same
holds true for the involved suppliers). Actively supporting supplier
cooperation may result in better combinations of suppliers' resources
and activity coordination, with beneﬁts to the buyer as well as other
actors in the supply network (Gadde & Håkansson, 2001).
Managing such cross-over effects (i.e. fostering or limiting them)
implies that one (or more) of the actors involved assumes an active
role towards the other actors and the relationships that link them
(Ford et al., 2003; Mouzas & Naudé, 2007). Supplier portfolios
therefore mirror ﬁndings by Holmen & Perdersen (2003) and Havila,
Johanson, and Thilenius (2004) about indirect business relationships
in networks settings. Holmen & Perdersen (2003) identiﬁed three
functions of managing such interactions: relating, isolating, and
mediating. A relating function in supplier portfolio management
refers to networking activities by the focal buyer to bring different
suppliers together by allowing them to relate directly. However, the
buyer company may choose to intentionally isolate suppliers from
each other (e.g., in order to play one against the other) (Ford et al.,
2003). Furthermore, a mediating function can be postulated, i.e. the
decision by the focal buyer to transfer certain resources (e.g.
knowledge, processes) from one supplier relationship to another.
According to Havila et al. (2004), these networking activities can
happen in ‘serial triads’, where activities are performed in sequential
dyads. Activities can also occur at the same time in ‘group poliads’,
requiring the collaboration of all actors to develop shared activities.
Concepts of connectivity, dependency, and interaction are central
to the IMP approach to explaining network characteristics (Ford et al.,
2003; Ford & Håkansson, 2006). Using a network perspective requires
an understanding of the effects that supplier relationships and their
interaction processes have upon each other (Araújo et al., 1999; Ford
&McDowell, 1999; Dubois & Pedersen, 2002; Mota & de Castro, 2005).
One crucial aspect relates to understanding horizontal relationships
between suppliers and how buying ﬁrms perceive and try to inﬂuence
these relationships. Buyer-dependent cross-over effects can be
distinguished from buyer-independent ones, depending on theinvolvement of the buyer in horizontal supplier relationships. It
remains unclear how these relationships and cross-over effects (if
they do exist) are established, developed and coordinated, which
strategic goals they respond to, and the role of different actors in
instigating and developing such horizontal supplier relationships.
Considering the interactive and contingent nature of business
relationships it seems unreasonable to expect that horizontal supplier
relationships can be ‘decided’ and implemented unilaterally by one
company (be it the buyer or one of the suppliers); rather one would
expect them to be co-determined by several actors involved.
Focusing on horizontal relationships, Easton, and Araújo (1992) and
Easton, Burrell, Rothschild, and Shearman (1993) suggest that cooper-
ation on the onehand, and conﬂict on the other,must be regarded as the
ends of a continuum of ‘co-relation’ possibilities between suppliers. The
authors offer a typology which includes ﬁve main categories of
relationshipswithin that continuum: conﬂict, competition, coexistence,
cooperation and collusion. Conﬂict arises when ﬁrms seek to destroy or
incapacitate their competitors. Competition, the second main category,
encompasses those strategies deﬁned to achieve a sustainable compet-
itive advantage. Coexistence happens when different suppliers are
independent or perceive themselves as independent. Cooperation
occurs when ﬁrms work together towards a common perceived
objective. Finally, collusion can be regarded as a particular case of
cooperation. It arises when competitors cooperate in order to injure a
thirdparty.A similar typologyof horizontal relationships is suggestedby
Bengtsson, and Kock (1999). However, these typologies refer to
relationships between suppliers in competition; thus, horizontal
relationships of a non-competitive nature are not considered, therefore
leaving room for further research in supplier networks.
While this paper is not about dyadic buyer–supplier relationships
per se, nor about how they should be differentiated in order to
optimize resource investments, dyads cannot be ignored within the
triadic perspective. They constitute an essential component of the
context where direct and indirect connections between suppliers
within a supplier network are created. Furthermore, inasmuch as one
of the major ﬂaws of portfolio models is the disregard for the
complementarities and interdependence of dyadic relationships, the
analysis of such issues requires some basic understanding of supplier
dyads, namely their strategic goals (e.g. efﬁciency or innovation),
their technical interfaces (standardized, speciﬁed, translated or
interactive) (Araújo et al., 1999), and the different actors' perceptions
and attitudes (Henneberg, Mouzas, & Naudé, 2006). In the same sense,
it is conceptually impossible to separate the dynamics of the
immediate tier-one supplier network from the wider network in
which the buyer and the suppliers are embedded in. Thus, while the
unit-of-analysis will be the limited network consisting of a focal buyer
company and its direct supplier network, some knowledge of the
expanded network and the way it affects the buyer–supplier–supplier
relationships at hand is necessary in the analysis.
2.3. Supplier networks: some research questions
Authors from the IMP group are prescriptive about the need to
evaluate and eventuallymanage the effects that supplier relationships
and their interaction processes have upon another (Araújo et al.,
1999; Ford & McDowell, 1999; Dubois & Pedersen, 2002; Mota & de
Castro, 2005). Nonetheless, studies going beyond a collection of
dyadic relationships and taking an integrated view on their connec-
tions and interdependencies are still scarce (cf. Araújo et al., 1999;
Ford & McDowell, 1999; Mota & de Castro, 2005; Choi & Wu, 2009),
leaving room for further research on how ﬁrms coordinate, inﬂuence
and mobilize supplier portfolios. More speciﬁcally, the extant
literature does not help us understand how horizontal supplier
relationships (and resulting cross-over effects) are established,
developed and coordinated, the goals they respond to and the roles
of the parties involved. Considering the interactive nature of
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‘decided’ and implemented unilaterally by a company; rather one
would expect them to be co-determined by the actors involved.
In short, the main goal of this article is to explore the interactive
structure and dynamics of supplier networks. Three main research
foci emerge:
(1) What types of interdependencies and cross-over effects exist
within supplier networks?
(2) How do such interdependencies emerge and develop?
(3) What is the impact of those interdependencies and how are
they perceived by the actors involved?
3. Research methodology
In order to come up with an accurate description of the
interdependencies and complexities of relationships in supplier
networks, a case study approach was adopted, allowing for a multi-
level investigation covering the buying companies' relationships with
their ﬁrst-tier suppliers and the supply network itself (for a
comprehensive discussion of the use of case studies in interorgani-
zational research see Andersen & Kragh, 2010; Easton, 2010;
Jårvensivu & Törnroos, 2010). Bonoma (1985) and Dubois, and Araújo
(2004;2007) argue that case research is likely to provide a signiﬁcant
contribution to the development of theory in the ﬁelds of purchasing
and supply management. Boundary issues, temporality as well as the
dynamic nature of relationships can be captured via such a case study
method.
Two industrial ﬁrms were selected as focal buyers (Vulcano in the
boiler manufacturing industry, and Adira in the mechanical engineer-
ing sector). Empirical data was collected through 62 semi-structured
interviews (lasting 1 to 3 h each). Interviews were held in the
interviewees' companies and were followed by a visit to the premises.
The interviewing process included different supply-related top and
middle managers (covering functions such as business development,
engineering, production, quality, procurement, purchasing and
logistics) from these two focal companies (14 respondents in total).
31 suppliers were also interviewed (18 from Vulcano and 13 from
Adira), leading to the analysis of 31 buyer–supplier dyads. The
supplier selection and interviewing focus followed a progressive
logic; the set of suppliers was identiﬁed according to two main
criteria: their perceived importance to the focal buyer, and the
longevity of buyer–supplier relationships in order to capture the
change processes over time. This resulted in dyads ranging from two
to 50 years old. Buyer–supplier relationships were used as the initial
focus of the data capture, followed by a study of the links between
suppliers, as well as the nature of the buyer's involvement in those
supplier relationships. In this way it was possible to progressively
map existing buyer–supplier and supplier–supplier relationships and
to build up a supply network view. This process resulted in the
identiﬁcation and analysis of 22 horizontal supplier–supplier dyads.
Suppliers were also questioned about other suppliers to the focal
company with whom they did not interact, thus allowing a wider
view of the supplier network. The different dyadic relationships
(between buyer–supplier as well as supplier–supplier) were also used
to analyze the cross-over effects. The collection and analysis of data
followed a conﬁguration analysis process proposed by Ragin (2000).
Each case (i.e. one focal buyer and its supplier network) was analyzed
separately in order to understand how the various themes combine in
an integrated and coherent conﬁguration, followed by a comparative
analysis of the two cases in order to identify and explain their (dis)
similarities. Data was collected mainly through the interviews, but
other sources such as websites, internal documents, press articles and
visits to the ﬁrms' premises were also used to complement and
triangulate data (Dubois & Gadde, 2002). Triangulation was also
achieved by contrasting the views of multiple interviewees. Allinterviews were taped, transcribed and sent to the interviewees for
possible corrections. Data was content analyzed according to
categories and themes derived from concepts identiﬁed in the
literature review in order to enhance internal validity (Krippendorff,
2004).
4. Supply networks case studies
4.1. Case study 1: Vulcano
Vulcano is a Boschmanufacturer of gas-ﬁred hot water boilers, and
constitutes Bosch's Competence Center in this product area. Since its
foundation in 1977, the company's success has depended on its ability
to forge links with external actors, especially suppliers, to add value to
the activities performed in-house. It invests in external relationships
that allow it to “integrate suppliers' capabilities as if they were ours”.
In the past, Vulcano has speciﬁed all details for sourced parts (such as
functions, materials and dimensions) and suppliers manufactured
them to these speciﬁcations. In recent years, however, Vulcano's
development team has been actively seeking suppliers' assistance in
developing such parts, especially in areas where it does not possess
sufﬁcient production or knowledge capabilities and does not want to
develop them itself. Thus, Vulcano expects all suppliers to “proactively
produce and suggest new solutions in terms of product speciﬁcations,
materials or processes”. To make participation of suppliers possible,
technical interfaces with suppliers are generally interactive. Addi-
tionally, suppliers' relationships with other clients are seen as a source
of diversity that is perceived positively by Vulcano.
Fig. 1 depicts the existing relationships between Vulcano and its
suppliers included in the study. Some of these suppliers belong to the
same specialization or competitive groups: plastic parts (Mas, Mis, Sp
and Tpe); stamped metallic parts (Ic and Si), injected metallic parts
(Fd and Sn); steel and other metals (Gv and Sl); turned parts (Gn, To
and USA). It is noteworthy that fourteen of these suppliers have
horizontal supplier–supplier links with each other, with or without
the involvement of the focal buyer Vulcano. Furthermore, thirteen
suppliers know who their direct competitors are in their business
relationship with Vulcano. However, this information is not trans-
mitted by the focal buyer, rather it is a characteristic of the close-knit
industry where competitors normally know each other, i.e. form a
‘competitive group’ (Bogner & Thomas, 1993; Fiegenbaum & Thomas,
1993). Despite the abundance of inter-supplier links, most suppliers
state that they feel no need to know speciﬁcally the other suppliers
whose parts are technically connected with what they provide to
Vulcano. Any technological adaptation necessary is dealt with as part
of the supply relationship with Vulcano and not within horizontal
supplier relationships. Thus, Vulcano plays an isolating role (Holmen
& Perdersen, 2003), which is perceived to be an effective way to
coordinate suppliers. If links between suppliers exist, they are
therefore often inﬂuenced by Vulcano, thus constituting indirect
and buyer-involved cross-over effects between suppliers in the
network. The horizontal supplier relationships are a result of, and
are to some extent controlled by, activities by Vulcano. Themajority of
the seven supplier–supplier relationships which are outside Vulcano's
sphere of inﬂuence (i.e. they represent buyer-independent and direct
cross-over effects) link two suppliers of steel and other metals (Sl and
GV in Fig. 1) to suppliers that use those raw-materials in their
products. There are also two cases (SI–IC and SN–FD) in which one
ﬁrm (IC and FD, respectively) had already supplied parts to the other
(SI and SN, respectively) as subcontractors prior to their involvement
with Vulcano. In fact, IC and FD were introduced to Vulcano by SI and
SN, in a situationwhen they themselves were not able to keep upwith
the rising demand from Vulcano. Despite the joining role (Holmen &
Perdersen, 2003) initially played by SI and SN and the fact that Si–IC
and SN–FD are competitors, all the actors involved believe that the
relationships between Vulcano and these suppliers are completely
Fig. 1. Vulcano's supplier portfolio.
Table 1
Causes of changes on current Vulcano suppliers' positioning.
Changes in supplier's balance
(rival suppliers only)
Structural reconﬁguration (rival and
non-rival suppliers)
• Reduction of prices and other efﬁciency
related investments
• Developing of new capabilities and
activities, leading to the
reconﬁguration of the portfolio
structure
• Improvement of logistical and quality
processes.
• Introduction of new suppliers
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themselves, thus ossifying Vulcano's role as lynchpin of the supplier
network.
Relationships involving Vulcano are all very similar, thus, only one
of these cases is analyzed in detail. AJF is an electronicmanufacturer of
alarm systems. It was selected by Vulcano to develop and manufac-
ture a remote control for one of its gas-ﬁred hot water boiler models.
AJF developed and speciﬁed all the electronic parts of the remote
control and selected the sub-suppliers in this area. As the company
does not possess the resources and capabilities needed to manufac-
ture core non-electronic parts of this component, such as the plastic
case, cables and LCD screen, it had to buy them from other companies.
Despite the fact that AJF was responsible for the overall component
project, it did not intervene in the development of the non-electronic
parts or in the selection of the respective sub-suppliers (which were
also direct suppliers to Vulcano). In fact, all these parts were speciﬁed
by Vulcano or co-developed by Vulcano's current suppliers, with
Vulcano negotiating the supply terms of these parts procured by AJF.
When the developing and test phases were completed and regular
production began, AJF assumed the leadership in the management of
relationships with the second-tier suppliers of all the parts.
This solution, i.e. Vulcano controlling the different supply relation-
ships in the initial phase after which the operational control is handed
over to AJF, is considered by Vulcano as well as by AJF to be beneﬁcial
for all parties. It is based on a shared understanding of the
complementarities between both ﬁrms' speciﬁc capabilities and
existing network connections. Vulcano uses suppliers with adequate
performance which are known to it, thus accelerating the process of
developing and testing the various parts. AJF on the other hand
achieves beneﬁts that would be impossible without the association
with Vulcano, e.g. lower purchase prices for the parts, reduced time
and costs of selecting and auditing different suppliers. Furthermore,
due to the fact that the focal buyer was responsible for the selection of
AJF’s second-tier suppliers, it makes it easier for AJF to press Vulcano
to intervene if problems should arise (especially because these
suppliers to AJF are also in direct supply relationships with Vulcano).
Some suppliers therefore assume the double role of ﬁrst-tier (to
Vulcano) and second-tier suppliers (to AJF). Inasmuch as the critical
activities (e.g. speciﬁcation and negotiation of terms) are undertaken
through the leadership of Vulcano, the inter-supplier relationships are
restricted to the operational issues of managing orders (such as
logistics and payments) that are perceived as less important. The fact
that the sales to the other suppliers are only a small portion of their
sales to Vulcano also contributes to this perception.
In the past, Vulcano has unsuccessfully tried to develop further
relationships and buyer-dependent cross-over effects between its
suppliers. For example, at one point it tried to persuade GV (one of its
two suppliers of steel) to expand the conditions and terms granted to
Vulcano to all the other Vulcano suppliers that use the same raw-
materials. Some of these suppliers already bought metals from GV but
at a higher price. The beneﬁt to Vulcano and its suppliers was clear: a
reduction in raw-material costs would reﬂect on the costs of parts
supplied to Vulcano. However, GV was of a different opinion, asVulcano's request would inevitably result in a reduction of GV's
margins. While this loss could be offset by the reinforcement of the
supply relationship GV has with Vulcano, GV was very reluctant to
accept this agreement, and ultimately declined to do so. In other failed
mediating experiences, Vulcano tried to bring several of its ﬁrst-tier
suppliers together to develop technically connected parts. However,
although some suppliers did mention that such contacts had existed,
they were unable to explain how and why they were initiated and
later terminated, and who was involved. Neither Vulcano nor the
suppliers seem interested in repeating or expanding these experi-
ments of further horizontal supplier–supplier integration via buyer-
dependent cross-over effects, and the Vulcano-supplier dyads are still
seen by most participants in the supply network as the best relational
governance for innovation and adaptation processes.
Compared to buyer-dependent cross-over effects, indirect inter-
actions (i.e. buyer-independent cross-over effects between different
Vulcano-supplier dyads) are quite frequent and arguably very
relevant, although they are not perceived by the actors to represent
a key characteristic of the supply network. These horizontal interac-
tions are mostly related to pricing issues, supplier capabilities (e.g.,
technical or logistical), and the diffusion of product or process
innovation as well as best-practice routines. Most Vulcano-supplier
interfaces are interactive, and many new solutions and innovations
are either supplier-based or are co-created with suppliers. When new
solutions produce relevant positive effects, this knowledge is diffused
via the interactive interfaces to other ﬁrst-tier suppliers in order to
multiply its beneﬁts. This diffusion is in fact mandatory if it relates to
changes in parts bought under dual sourcing agreements. In one
speciﬁc situation, a Chinese manufacturer proposed an innovation
relating to the design of one part; this option was tested and resulted
in superior performance in the use of raw-materials and manufac-
turing process issues. Consequently, the knowledge about this
innovation was communicated to a Spanish manufacturer (Rc in
Fig. 1) who supplied the same part to Vulcano. Thus, while these
represent buyer-independent cross-over effects, they are neverthe-
less facilitated by the interactive nature of the different Vulcano-
supplier relationships (Table 1).
Such indirect cross-over effects can also relate to pricing, or
changes in capabilities. Price is an important factor when selecting a
supplier for a new part or when renegotiating supply terms. Vulcano
does not bargain about prices or use alternative supplier bids to force
suppliers to cut prices. However, every two or three years, Vulcano
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potential ones, especially regarding pricing. According to Vulcano, this
activity forces suppliers to constantly consider how they can become
more productive in order to strengthen their relative positioning vis-
à-vis rival suppliers. Thus, Vulcano's monitoring activity, together
with the fact that it is open about these activities with its suppliers
provides the structural prerequisites for indirect supplier–supplier
cross-over effects.
Logistics is another area where cross-over effects can be seen.
Logistics routines (e.g. order processes, production and delivery
plans) adopted by Vulcanowith one supplier are often replicated with
other suppliers, even in different product groups, e.g. by non-rival
suppliers. However, this replication is easier in relationships with
otherwise competing suppliers that normally have similar production
resources and processes. On the other hand, all suppliers are informed
of the average supplier performance in these areas. As logistics
accounts for about one third of the suppliers' evaluation done by
Vulcano, this information serves as an internal benchmark within the
supply network, and is thus a strong incentive for suppliers that are
falling below the average to improve their performance.
The evolution of individual suppliers' resources and capabilities
has had a strong impact on the evolution of their relationships with
Vulcano. Changes in one supplier or changes in the resulting
relationship with Vulcano have a more or less profound impact on
several other ﬁrst-tier suppliers, i.e. changes spill over within the
supply network. Some of these buyer-independent cross-over effects
are negative. For instance, investments resulting in efﬁciency gains
(e.g. by buying equipment with higher productivity) may result in the
reduction of purchases by Vulcano from less efﬁcient suppliers (i.e.
competitive or conﬂicting relationships between suppliers result).
However, if suppliers improve their performance to match the new
supply network benchmark, they may recover their previous position.
Similarly, if a supplier invests in new andmore value-adding activities
(e.g. new product development), its supply relationship with Vulcano
may be substantially altered, for example by changing its position
within the supply network vis-à-vis Vulcano through becoming a
preferred supplier in new projects. The development of new
capabilities and activities may also lead to the reconﬁguration of the
supply network itself, as in the case of AJF which became a preferred
ﬁrst-tier supplier, while other Vulcano suppliers were subsequently
relegated to second-tier status under the operational control of AJF.
4.2. Case study 2: Adira
Adira, founded in 1956, is the Iberian leader in tool-machinery
manufacturing. Adira strongly believes that its success is based on its
internal set of capabilities, and suppliers are perceived to have only
limited relevance for its value creation process. This belief is reinforced
by Adira's view of its suppliers as generally having very limited
technical capabilities. Consequently, Adira prefers to have proprietary
control over resources rather than to make use of external resources.
The machines are entirely developed and designed by Adira and the
same is true for the speciﬁcation of all sourced parts, components, and
materials. The company has two main types of suppliers: catalogue
suppliers and subcontracted suppliers. Catalogue suppliers range from
multi-brand parts wholesalers to national agents or local subsidiaries
of multi-national ﬁrms such as Bosch or Siemens, selling standardized
parts and components. Subcontracted suppliers range from small to
medium-size ﬁrms that manufacture parts according to Adira's
speciﬁcations. Adira uses both groups of suppliers to pursue efﬁciency
beneﬁts – lower costs, higher ﬂexibility, and sourcing risk reduction,
i.e. availability – and quality beneﬁts. Catalogue suppliers aremanaged
through standardized interfaces, and subcontracted suppliers through
speciﬁed ones (Araújo et al., 1999). In both cases, Adira generally
believes that it controls and dominates the relationships and
subcontracted suppliers agree with this view.Fig. 2 depicts Adira's ﬁrst tier supply network. Subcontracted
suppliers (MA, MS, CS, TS and JRM) are rival, small to medium-size
ﬁrms that manufacture parts according to Adira's speciﬁcations. Four
of them (MS, CS, TS and JRM) are heavily dependent on Adira's
purchases and have few alternative clients. Eleven of the suppliers
involved in the study know or are aware of other suppliers to Adira,
and nine are involved in supplier–supplier interactions. Such
reciprocal knowledge results from the characteristic of their indus-
tries or from information involuntarily provided by the focal buyer
(e.g. mixed-up orders or simultaneous delivery windows). Such
knowledge about competitors is generally unintentional on Adira's
part, and is perceived as of low information value by all the actors
involved. In fact, both Adira and the suppliers themselves feel that
direct relationships between suppliers are unnecessary. Since the
focal buyer speciﬁes all the parts, suppliers do not need to have direct
contact with each other, even in cases where they are producing
interconnected parts. The suppliers generally state that they do not
have much knowledge about any of Adira's other supplier relation-
ships and that they feel no impact from those relationships. Inter-
supplier horizontal relationships developed outside of Adira's in-
volvement are not very prevalent in this supply network. With the
exception of the steel distributor FR (see Fig. 2) which sells to several
other supply network members, suppliers do not see themselves as
buyers from or suppliers to each other. In any case, those relationships
that do exist (e.g. in FR's case) are seen as totally independent from
Adira, and thus as having no perceived relevance on the supply
relationships with the focal buyer.
As stated, inter-supplier relationships with the involvement of
Adira (i.e. buyer-dependent cross-over effects) are rare. In fact, two of
the cases depicted in Fig. 2 were terminated during the data collection
phase. In one triad, MC supplied Adira with electronic components
while sourcing parts (electric transformers) from EL. MC played a
logistical and administrative role in this triad: taking care of order and
delivery management, invoicing and payments. For this, MC received
a commission. Prices and product speciﬁcation were set by Adira and
EL. However, MC was frequently ignored by Adira; EL was contacted
directly in order to discuss technical issues and to place and pick-up
urgent orders. As MC was eventually seen by both Adira and MC to
add costs rather than value to their relationship, it was cut out of this
relationship, and Adira and EL formed a direct dyad.
A similar case of disintermediarization relates to GC (Bosch's
national representative in Portugal). Adira bought hydraulic valves
from Rexroth and other components from GC. When Bosch bought
Rexroth, GC became its representative, too. As buying valves from GC
would have been very expensive, Adira continued to buy them from
Rexroth with GC receiving a commission to take care of logistics,
orders and payments, and to provide technical support. Adira
perceived GC's technical capabilities to be very poor and claimed
that it only worked as a ‘mail box’ and a ‘buffer’ between Adira and
Rexroth. During the completion of the research project, Bosch–
Rexroth (BR) changed its international sales strategy and promoted
the joint management of the Spanish and Portuguese markets. In this
process, GC lost country sales representation to a Spanish afﬁliate of
Bosch–Rexroth and its intermediation role was consequently termi-
nated. However, GC still sells Adira other hydraulic components and
technical support.
In another case of supplier interactions, Pol makes surface
treatments for metallic parts and supplies Adira as well as some
subcontracted suppliers. Prices and supply terms are negotiated with
Adira. Part suppliers transport the parts to Pol, and after the treatment
they pick up the parts and deliver them to Adira. Adira could easily
concentrate all the suppliers' parts and be the sole client of Pol, but the
current arrangement enables it to cut costs by transferring logistic
activities to subcontracted suppliers. As the subcontracted suppliers
also get better prices from Pol, the overall costs for the parts are
smaller for Adira. However, the relationships between Pol and the
Fig. 2. Adira's supplier portfolio.
931C. Roseira et al. / Industrial Marketing Management 39 (2010) 925–935subcontracted suppliers are very tense and ripe with conﬂict. Due to
the small sizes and short delivery lead times of Adira's orders, the
costs of all involved suppliers are very high (e.g. due to transport or
machine setup costs) and none of these suppliers is satisﬁed with the
solution. The suppliers feel compelled to accept the supply relation-
ship constellation due to their dependence on Adira's purchases.
Finally, suppliers MS, CS and TS, which are physically co-located,
informally coordinate their deliveries to Adira. Each supplier has a
speciﬁc delivery day deﬁned by Adira. If an order is needed on a
different day, one of the other suppliers will deliver the order together
with its own. As the effects of this informal arrangement are seen as
positive and reciprocal (delivery costs and lead times are reduced), all
the involved actors are willing to continue this solution.
Indirect cross-over effects between different Adira-supplier dyads
have a signiﬁcant impact on this supply network, similar to the
Vulcano case. Price represents an important dimension of these
effects. For the catalogue suppliers, Adira compares the tenders, and
prices are often renegotiated in order to force suppliers to cut them. In
the case of subcontracted suppliers, Adira sets the prices for parts, and
these are generally accepted (suppliers will inevitably lose the
contract if they do not accept the set prices). Transfer of orders
from one supplier to another is a frequent occurrence. Besides the
price competition, the ability to respond to the frequent changes of
Adira's production plans is also a determinant of cross-over effects in
this context. In a small number of situations, Adira has reciprocity
agreements with suppliers: Adira sells a machine to a supplier and in
return it is obliged to buy from them a given number of parts. This
may result in transferring the production of parts away from other
suppliers until this volume agreement is fulﬁlled. Often such transfer
of orders has a temporary effect, resulting in oscillations within the
supply network: when the modalities are fulﬁlled (e.g. volume
requirements), the regular supplier wins the order back. These
occasional supply relationship transfers within the network are
considered as ‘normal business practice’ and are accepted by all
suppliers. Changes linked to suppliers' resources, on the other hand
are of a more long-term nature. Suppliers that invest in more efﬁcient
machinery or processes will gain a higher share of Adira's purchases,
shifting demand away from other suppliers. Even if this makes the less
efﬁcient suppliers dissatisﬁed, Adira's overall importancemakes them
reconcile themselves to those losses.Table 2
Causes of cross-over effects on current Adira suppliers' positioning.
Type of effects Long-term effects in
suppliers' balance
(rivals)
Transitory effects in
suppliers' balance (rivals)
Suppliers
Catalogue suppliers Persistent problems of
prices and delivery lead
times
• Prices
• Delivery lead times
• Reciprocity agreements
Subcontracted suppliers • Evolution of resources
• Unsolvable conﬂictsTable 2 summarizes themost frequent cross-over effects evident in
Adira's supply network. The causes of structural cross-over effects are
different in the two groups of suppliers. In the case of catalogue
suppliers, persistence of problems regarding prices and delivery lead
times are the most important factors of supplier interaction effects
with the involvement of Adira. However, in the case of subcontracted
suppliers, prices are set by the focal company and delivery lead times
are highly conditioned by the frequent changes that occur in its
production plans. Thus, these factors are not the major factors of
cross-over effects. Suppliers' investments in more efﬁcient resources,
on the other hand, represent the most determining causes of cross-
over effects. Exclusion of suppliers is rare, normally resulting from
irresolvable conﬂicts due to disloyalty issues rather than from cross-
over effects created within the supply network. Transitory cross-over
effects happen in the same way for both groups of suppliers. The main
causes for them are price and lead time issues, as well as temporal
reciprocity agreements.
5. Analysis and results
In this section, the ﬁndings of both cases will be discussed,
speciﬁcally the types of interdependencies that exist in supplier
portfolios, why and how they emerge and develop, and, ﬁnally, how
focal buyers and suppliers perceive the impact of such
interdependencies.
5.1. Types of interdependencies and cross-over effects within supplier
portfolios
5.1.1. Direct and indirect effects
A variety of links between suppliers exist in both case studies of
supplier networks, occasionally outside the sphere of inﬂuence of the
focal buyers (buyer-independent cross-over effects). These links
range from mere awareness of each other's existence, to social
bonds, or to actual cooperative economic relationships. Such supplier
relationships mainly relate to the logic of the supplying industry and
are mostly perceived by the relevant actors as having no effect on
their relationships with the focal buyers. With regard to the links
between suppliers involving the focal buyer (i.e. buyer-dependent
cross-over effects), two distinct types of links emerge: indirect links
resulting from the cross-over effects of speciﬁc buyer–supplier dyads
on other supplier relationships of the focal buyer, and direct links
embodied in actual interactions between two or more suppliers. The
most frequent occurrences are based on indirect links rather than on
direct links between suppliers. The case studies indicate that both
direct and indirect supplier interactions are predominantly focused on
efﬁciency issues (such as prices and logistic processes). Direct
supplier interactions play no role in innovation activities in the case
studies (such as changing a product, or developing a new compo-
nent); these issues are dealt with either by the focal buyer, by
individual suppliers, or in individual buyer–supplier dyadic
relationships.
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ly distributed along the supplier portfolio. One factor playing an
important role in this context relates to the similarity of suppliers (e.g.
exhibiting similar technical resources and capabilities, thus building
specialization groups), as depicted in Fig. 3. As both focal buying
companies use multiple sourcing strategies, they frequently interact
with two or three suppliers with similar activities and resources,
selling similar parts (e.g. suppliers of injected plastic parts). As would
be expected, cross-effects (buyer-dependent as well as buyer-
independent) are stronger in the groups of rival suppliers (i.e. the
specialization groups), and weaker between them. The higher cross-
over intensity in the specialization groups relates to themost frequent
cross-over effects which were identiﬁed, i.e. reduction of prices and
transfer of orders that necessarily occur between alternative suppli-
ers. Even when the buyer does not use alternative supply sources to
force suppliers to cut prices, as in the case of Vulcano, suppliers feel
that pressure and associate lost orders with their refusal or inability to
follow their competitors' prices. Furthermore, the diffusion of
innovation within supplier networks is easier within the same
specialization groups. When production contexts and resources tend
to be similar, the replication of changes of parts, quality procedures,
productive processes, etc. is facilitated. However, despite context
similarities, changes are sometimes hard to transfer between
suppliers due to their tacit nature. These and other emerging
problems are always dealt with in the direct buyer–supplier
relationships.
Changes in the suppliers' industries are also a strong inducer of
change. In both case studies, the pressure of focal buyers to obtain
lower prices is fostered by a similar trend in suppliers' markets,
highlighting the impact of environmental factors as suggested by
Zolkiewski, and Turnbull (2002). Thus, price reduction tends to affect
all suppliers due to this globalizing trend, even if it affects some
supplier groups more severely than others. However, other aspects of
change, for example those of a more speciﬁc nature such as the
evolution in production equipment, have different impact on different
groups. When efﬁciency is pursued through the indirect supplier links
described, changes are usually contained in each specialization group
of similar suppliers, and do not normally affect the overall structure of
the supplier network in terms of actors, resources and activities.
However, and less frequently, efﬁciency goals may require the re-
organization of the whole supply network structure and the
reconﬁguration of different actors' roles, thereby leading to the
establishment of direct interactions between suppliers.
5.1.2. Competitive nature of interdependencies
In both case studies, relationships between competitors mostly
resemble the categories of competition and co-existence identiﬁed
Easton and Araújo (1992), Easton et al. (1993) and Bengtsson, and Kock
(1999). Competition is an outcome of the pressure suppliers feel to
improve due to the focal buyers' explicit demands (or based on their
own interpretations of implicit cues from the buyer, e.g. lost orders). Co-
existence seems to exist when suppliers perceive their relationshipsFig. 3. Intensity of cross-over effects in supplier portfolios within/between specializa-
tion groups.with the focal buyer as independent from the other buyer–supplier
relationships in the supply network. The prevalence of co-existence is
higher in Adira's supplier network than in Vulcano's. Higher stability
(e.g. relationship age, routinized activities, established network roles),
less openness and interactivity of the (especially technical) interfaces
betweenAdira and the suppliers, and individual supplier evaluation (no
overall benchmarking) seems to facilitate supplier myopia to the
potential impacts of their competitors' relationships with the focal
buyer. Coopetition (Bengtsson&Kock, 1999) is rare; thegroupof Adira's
suppliers coordinating deliveries is the single example found in both
case studies. Cooperation and conﬂict exist, although not usually
between competing suppliers but between complementary suppliers.
In both supplier networks, some suppliers are involved with each other
in triadic structures (thus also involving the focal buyer), either as
suppliers to each other (e.g. Vulcano-AJF-TPE and Adira-Po-JRM triads),
or when suppliers intermediate the relationship between another
supplier and the focal buyer (e.g. Adira-GC-BR and Adira-MC-EL). As
expected, a minimal amount of cooperation is needed for these
relational arrangements to succeed. While some conﬂict can also be
expected in any business relationship, these arrangements can gain a
conﬂictivenaturewhen they are perceived asnegative to the interests of
one ormore actors (as in the Adira-Pol-JRM triad) or when one ormore
actors are perceived as a low-value counterpart by the other triad
participants (e.g. Adira-MC-EL).
5.1.3. Nature, scope and intensity of cross-over effects
Interdependencies may be based on similar resources used by
suppliers to produce similar products, constituting alternative supply
sourcing within specialization group. Changes in the resources of one
supplier may result in an improved position, and consequently a
weakened position of another supplier vis-a-vis the focal buyer. For
instance, the investment in more efﬁcient production equipment may
result in lower prices and an increase of the quota of the buyer
purchases in that speciﬁc category. However, if activities and products
remain unchanged, the durability of the efﬁciency-related cross-over
effects (cf. Tables 1 and 2) depends on the ability of suppliers to
respond to their competitors' moves. If suppliers are unable to keep
up with their competitors, changes in the suppliers' positioning
(relative importance vis-à-vis the focal buyer) may become structural.
However, they may be able to address these changes by making
similar investments in more efﬁcient execution and reverse this
situation. In this case, changes of the suppliers' different positions in
the supply network will only be transitory, until the ‘weakened’
supplier regains its position. Such resource-related changes translate
to cross-over or indirect effects and their scope is normally limited to
rival suppliers.
Interdependencies may also result from changes in the activities
performed by the suppliers. Changes in activities are normally
supported by the acquisition of new capabilities that are more costly
to emulate than tangible resources. A change in the activities of a
speciﬁc supplier may originate a change is its role within the supplier
network. For instance, the investment in new activities may enable a
manufacturing supplier to perform assembling activities previously
executed by the focal buyer. A change in the structure of the supplier
network will occur, as new relationships are formed between
previously unconnected suppliers (e.g. assembly and parts suppliers).
The scope of activity-related changes is wider than that of the
resource-related ones, as it may result in improved positioning vis-à-
vis rival suppliers (indirect effects), and it may also affect non-rival
suppliers that become counterparts.
Finally, actors can also be the source of change in supplier networks.
Inclusion of new and more resourceful suppliers may lead to the loss
of importance or replacement of existing ones. Perceived disloyalty on
the part of suppliers is indicated in both case studies as the single
reason for deﬁnitive elimination of a supplier by the focal buyer.
While both aspects impact only on the competitors of the excluded or
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driver of change, at least not in the two case studies analyzed.
5.2. Emergence and development of interdependencies within supplier
portfolios
Cross-over effects in supplier networks can result in the diffusion
of innovation (e.g. changes in parts, raw-materials or production
processes), or more frequently in efﬁciency improvements (e.g. price
reduction). The dynamics of the diffusion of such changes (efﬁciency
or innovation) from one buyer–supplier dyad to another dyad (cross-
over effect) is conditioned by the roles actors play, as well as the type
of relationship adopted by the various suppliers. As shown in Fig. 4,
the origin of changes can be the suppliers (Model 1) or the buyer
(Model 2). The adoption of relationships that foster supplier initiative
and proactivity (e.g. with interactive interfaces) multiply the sources
and frequency of changes and induce stronger dynamics in the
supplier portfolio. Furthermore, when suppliers play an active role
(Model 1), there is a higher potential for innovation that derives from
the diversity of their idiosyncratic experiences with other actors, e.g.
other buyers. Such a possibility of exploring diversity is severely
reduced when the focal buyer dominates the relationships (as in
Model 2), for example due to speciﬁed interfaces (Araújo et al., 1999).
These ﬁndings are in line with Foss, and Loasby (1998), who have
argued that the creation of knowledge (such as innovation) is fostered
by the diversity of conjectures about new uses for existing resources,
as is in the case of dynamic suppliers (e.g. Model 1 in Fig. 4), while
strong control by the buyer diminishes that diversity and the
possibility to innovate. As Loasby (1998) argues, control frustrates
the development of capabilities that one might later wish to access.
A higher openness and interactivity of relationships within a
supply network also contributes to higher awareness of supplier
interdependence. As mentioned in Section 5.1.2, suppliers' myopia to
the potential impacts of their competitors' relationships with the focal
buyer is higher in the case of Adira than in the case of Vulcano. As
Vulcano's suppliers are more aware of their interdependencies, they
actively seek to protect or strengthen their positioning vis-à-vis other
suppliers. Consequently, awareness of interdependencies feeds
suppliers' initiatives to invest in new resources, capabilities, and
activities and their response to buyer's requests regarding innovation
or efﬁciency-related investments, as suggested by Dubois, and
Fredriksson (2008). Despite these differences, the buyer plays a
major role as a mediator between the suppliers in both case studies. In
fact, both focal buyers (Adira and Vulcano) normally perform an
isolation or mediation function (Holmen & Perdersen, 2003), allowing
them to induce buyer-dependent cross-over effects and to ﬁlter the
effects that are transferred from one supplier to another according to
their interests and goals.
When suppliers take on an activity previously performed by the
buyer, e.g. assembly tasks, it normally implies the creation of triads
involving suppliers of different specialization groups that execute
dissimilar and close complementary activities in the production chain
of the buyer's products. Their basic underlying rationale is linked toFig. 4. Dynamics of relationships' cross-overefﬁciency beneﬁts, translated into lower costs of suppliers' products
(reﬂected in suppliers' selling prices to the focal buyer) and more
efﬁcient logistics processes. In Vulcano's case, these arrangements
also eliminate the need to audit and test sub-suppliers, reducing the
time-to-market of new products. The analysis of the content and
dynamic of these arrangements revealed that they are similar to the
concept of serial triads (Havila et al., 2004), in that the actors do not
interact with all the others at the same time or in the same way.
Fig. 5 represents this situation. In these schemes, relationships are
‘incomplete’. Each of them uses only a part of the resources and
activities that normally exist in buyer–supplier relationships, working
as a piece of a wider puzzle. In fact, the activities executed in buyer–
supplier relationships are different from those performed in the
supplier–supplier relationships, corresponding to different phases of a
‘classical’ buyer–supplier relationship. This sequential organization is
supported by the complementary and dissimilar activities of the
several actors involved.
Activities such as speciﬁcation of parts, new product development,
or negotiation of supply terms are kept in the strict sphere of buyer–
supplier dyads (phase 1 in Fig. 5). Suppliers then coordinate the
ordering/delivery of the parts/materials to the supplier (S2) in charge
of the assembly or ﬁnishing of the component (phase 2); this product/
component is then later delivered to the focal buyer (phase 3). Thus,
the coordination and exploration of the most complex and dynamic
supplier capabilities is always performed by the focal buyer. Suppliers
are responsible for the more operational activities, which are less
dense in resources and supported mainly by static capabilities. These
schemes allow suppliers to coordinate highly complementary and
dissimilar activities (Richardson, 1972) while keeping relational
processes close to transactional relationships with low interactivity
and complexity. The more complex tasks of combining the resources
and activities of suppliers (deciding who does what) is done less by
direct supplier–supplier relationships but rather by their dyadic
relationships with the focal buyer.
5.3. Perceived impact of interdependencies on the actors involved
In all the identiﬁed triads, one of the companies involved acts as an
intermediary between the other companies. The focal buyer plays this
relating function (Holmen & Perdersen, 2003) when there are no
previous economic interactions between the suppliers, facilitating the
establishment of relationships. The value of the intermediary in the
eyes of the intermediated ﬁrms seems to strongly condition the
success of these relational schemes. In the triads that were dissolved
during the empirical phase of this project (speciﬁcally in the Adira
case), the intermediary was perceived as not adding any real value
compared to a direct connection between the intermediated compa-
nies. The persistence of supplier–supplier relationships outside the
intermediary's inﬂuence is highly dependent on the widening of the
interaction beyond the scope of the triad. For example, S1 (in Fig. 5)
produces a part that is assembled together with other parts by S2 to
form a component speciﬁed by or with the focal buyer. The activities
and resources mobilized between S1 and S2 are dependent on theireffects (example of innovation effects).
Fig. 5. Sequential triads.
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between the focal buyer and S1 or S2 is broken, the dissolution of the
connection between S1 and S2 will follow as it is solely based on the
presence of the common buyer. This is a common event in one of the
case studies, i.e. Vulcano transfers the assembly activities from one
supplier to another and the relationships between the suppliers of the
parts with the former ‘assembler’ are broken, and replicated with the
new one. In the opposite direction, as GC's role was not restricted to
the intermediation between Adira and Bosch–Rexroth, it was able to
maintain the relationship (even if modiﬁed) with the focal buyer
when the triad was dissolved.
These ﬁndings expose the strong dependence of direct supplier–
supplier relationships on buyer–supplier dyads. As seen before, the
creation of triads wasmainly due to changes in the activities performed
by some suppliers within those dyads. Thus, it seems reasonable to
expect that further changes, namely, a deeper involvement and
responsibility of suppliers in the development process, may require
more intense contacts between them. In such a situation, suppliers will
quite probably need to share or co-develop activities, e.g. designing and
testing new components. In such cases, someof the existing serial triads
may become group poliads (Havila et al., 2004) which require the
bringing together of all the actors to develop shared activities. If this
evolution proves to be positive to the suppliers involved in shared or
co-developed activities, they may decide to replicate these arrange-
ments in their relationships with other buyers.
6. Conclusions and contributions
6.1. Summary of ﬁndings
The individual and comparative analysis of the cases revealed
three phenomena. Firstly, the management of supplier–supplier
relationships within portfolios is not a major issue in the context of
supplier management, as revealed in both case studies. Horizontal
relationships between suppliers, with or without the intervention of
the focal buyer, have limited relevance. This marginality of relation-
ships between suppliers results from the perceptions of dyadic
relationships as the most suitable mechanism to fulﬁll both buyers'
and suppliers' goals. In fact, although suppliers are necessarily
interdependent, that interdependence is embodied more in the
cross-over effects of buyer–supplier dyads than in direct links
between suppliers. While not evident in any of these cases, it is
possible that amore active and strategic role of suppliers, e.g. a deeper
involvement in new product development, may result in a higher
prevalence and importance of direct relationships between suppliers
and in the organization of these relationships in group poliads rather
than in sequential triads. However, further research is needed to test
this idea. Secondly, the dynamics of the diffusion of the effects of one
buyer–supplier dyad to other dyads is conditioned by the roles actors
play in those relationships and by the structures (e.g., interface
characteristics) and content (e.g., functions) of those relationships.Finally, as direct relationships between suppliers are rare and of
limited effect in our case examples, the focal buyers exert a strong
control over suppliers' interdependencies and seems to be able to
manage them in a way that best suits their own goals and interests.
6.2. Theoretical contributions
This paper provides new insights into the structure and manage-
ment of supplier portfolios, as well as on their dynamics and
perceived impact by both the focal buyers and their suppliers. It
also furthers the knowledge and understanding of ﬁrms' attitudes and
actions in this ﬁeld.
Firstly, the paper identiﬁes a number of factors that contribute to
the prevalence or absence of direct links between suppliers. It also
highlights the process and dynamics of knowledge and innovation
diffusion within supplier portfolios. The paper identiﬁes buyer–
supplier dyads as the essential pillar both of the creation and
management of direct relationships between suppliers, and of the
management of cross-over effects of individual buyer–supplier
relationships. Dyads between the focal buyer and its suppliers are
the space reserved for the combination and development of the most
valued resources, leaving to the supplier–supplier relationships the
activities perceived as low-value and low-impact for their businesses.
Buyer–supplier dyads are also important as their content and
conﬁguration condition the intensity and scope of cross-over effects.
The paper suggests that an excessive control on the buyer side
makes it the single source of innovation, thereby restricting the
possibility of exploring suppliers' innovation capabilities and repli-
cating their effects in the portfolio. While dependency on buyers
facilitates suppliers' compliance with the buyer demands, evidence
was also found that in order to organize and mobilize actual
interaction between indirect counterparts, the ‘intermediator’/‘mobi-
lizer’ must conciliate, or at least, not harm their interests and make
itself valuable to them.
Finally, at a methodological level, by conducting a multi-level
investigation (with the buyer–supplier dyadic level and the supplier
portfolio/network level being central), it was possible to show a more
holistic and integrative type of supplier management than previous
studies have done. Speciﬁcally, the paper uncovers links between the
dyadic and network levels, thereby enabling a degree of understand-
ing and explanation of supplier network phenomena which provide
rich ground for further research.
6.3. Managerial contributions
The ﬁndings of our case analysis stress the potential impact of
supplier portfolios on the enhancement of focal buyers' performance.
As such, clear managerial implications for practical activities result.
Fostering the creation of direct relationships between suppliers and
managing the resulting cross-over effects may result in a higher
efﬁciency and innovation of both buyers and suppliers. However,
935C. Roseira et al. / Industrial Marketing Management 39 (2010) 925–935managers must be aware of the fact that this potential is severely
conditioned by the type of suppliers that ﬁrms workwith and bywhat
occurs in each dyadic relationships, e.g. the roles played by suppliers.
If a set of efﬁcient and innovative suppliers is a sine qua non condition
to enhance the performance of all the actors involved, the focal buyer
has a central role in diffusing and leveraging efﬁciency and innovation
gains produced in individual relationships to other relationships
within the portfolio. Being able to recognize the potential that resides
in each supplier relationship and how its beneﬁts can bemultiplied by
its diffusion to other relationships is undoubtedly a central task in the
management of supplier portfolios.
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